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Pricing Strategy Under Monopoly
Conditions: An Experiment for the
Classroom
Robert G. Nelson and Richard O. Beil, Jr.*
Abstract
This classroom experiment allows students to explore pricing strategies available to the
monopolist. Students are given full information about their costs but know nothing about demand
except that it is simulated by the instructor. They submit their price-asked and quantity-offered
records on one day and receive the quantity-sold response from the instructor on the next day,
continuing this routine until they discover the profit-maximizing price and quantity. One of the
objectives is to demonstrate that search strategies based on economic principles (MC=MR) can be
more efficient than trial-and-error.
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The monopolist holds a special place in the
imagination and comprehension of the general
public. Often characterized as amassing vast profits
at the expense of the common people, the wicked
monopolist executes this brigandage by charging
prices far higher than helpless consumers can
afford. The experiment described in this paper is
designed to show undergraduate students what it is
like to be a monopolist from an economic
perspective. Using experiential learning, the student
can explore the meaning of such expressions as “the
monopolist charges what the market will bear” and
discovers why the monopolist is a “price searcher”
instead of a “price taker.”
In terms of economic principles there are
just three somewhat prosaic features that
characterize monopoly in the elementary setting of
the economics laborato~:
(1) The monopolist faces a downward-sloping
demand curve. This may or may not allow
him to charge an indecently high price and
still sell some of his product. In fact, the
strategic principles are the same for the
monopolistic competitor and the perfect
competitor (which can be demonstrated
simply by changing the slope of the
demand curve until it is horizontal).
(2) There is no need to consider the reactions
of rivals in making pricing decisions since
the monopolist has no rivals, by definition.
(3) In most expositions (and in this
experiment) the monopolist’s demand
curve convenient y remains constant while
he searches for the profit-maximizing
point.
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How the monopolist chooses price and
quantity to maximize profits using marginal analysis
is often graphically illustrated in the classroom by
plotting the demand and marginal revenue curves
for the firm’s product (usually with a linear demand
curve), plotting the average and marginal cost
curves, using the intersection of marginal cost with
marginal revenue to establish the profit-maximizing
quantity, and finally determining price from the
demand curve.
However, there is another strategy that will
work: trial-and-error. The monopolist can explore
various combinations of total revenue and total cost
until it is established that any move away from a
certain price and quantity will only lower profit. In
fact it is likely that this strategy will be exploited by
students who have had no formal instruction in the
MC=MR approach, or who do not know how to
operationalize it. Moreover, in the “real world”
there may be reasons to prefer this strategy.
In this experiment each student is a
separate monopolist, although teams could be
formed in large classes and be used to illustrate
principles of cooperative oligopolies and cartels.
The demand for the product is simulated by the
instructor (i.e. the buyer population is just a fixed
demand fimction). The demand schedule is not
revealed to the students--finding it (or at least
exploring it) is the essential task. Students are each
given a schedule of costs for producing a perishable
good (Appendix). Then they each submit a sheet of
paper indicating the quantity of the good that they
are bringing to market and the price they are asking.
The next day they find out how many of their units
were bought at the asking price. From this they can
calculate their earnings for that period. Given a
sufficient number of periods in which to search,
most students can find the price and quantity
combination that maximizes their earnings by trial-
and-error alone. Subsequent lectures and homework
problems on the graphical solution (using MC=MR
principles) can be used to demonstrate that search
strategies based on economic theory are more
efficient.
Since records need to be submitted and
retrieved over many class periods, these can double
as a record of class attendance. This, together with
the incentive derived from converting profits from
the game into bonus grade points, has proved to be
an excellent motivating influence.
Instructions for the Teacher
The presentation of this experiment is
directed to lower-division undergraduate students
from all disciplines who may or may not have had
a Principles course in macroeconomics. It is not
necessary that students understand the application of
MC=MR in order to play this game. In the class
described here (Agricultural Marketing, with mostly
sophomores and juniors), some students recalled the
marginal principle and the graphical solution from
previous courses and successfully applied this
knowledge, although the subject was not covered in
lectures until late in this class.
Record keeping is more orderly if students
submit their “Price Asked and Quantity Offered”
sheets and retrieve their “Quantity Sold and Profit”
results on alternating days. In a class of 28
students, all facing the same demand curve and cost
schedule, the first students found the profit-
maximizing P and Q after about ten periods. By the
sixteenth period (the last day of the experiment), 2 I
students had found the optimum combination.
There are three features of the game
instructions that are noteworthy: there is no
guarantee that all units produced can be sold, the
product is perishable, and units are not divisible.





unlike production-to-order, with advance
production the quantity that will sell at a
given price is not known beforehand, so
underproduction and overproduction are
possible
since the product is perishable, unsold units
cannot be carried over as inventory
if the monopolist overproduces he can
suffer net losses by incurring costs (for
units letl unsold) that are not exceeded by
gross revenues
the demand “curve” is actually a step
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In view of the potential for incurring
losses, if earnings are converted to bonus points it
may be necessary to set up a “line-of-credit” to
cover such losses in order to give students a
positive incentive to play the game. As an example,
the instructions in the Appendix explain that one
percentage point will be added to the student’s final
grade for every $10,000 earned in the game. In
addition, a $10,000 line-of-credit is provided. The
line-of-credit is not incorporated into the final
earnings for the game; it serves only as a “safety
net” for initial losses due to overproduction. The
student can incur $10,000 in losses before being
dropped from the game--a highly unlikely event,
Without such a line-of-credit some students might
elect to not play at all. With the line-of-credit they
cannot lower their course grade by playing the
game. In addition, a student who does not submit
a price/quantity offer in a period (say, due to an
unexcused absence) can be fined $1,000 to cover
“overhead”. Fines plus losses cannot exceed the
line-of-credit. This fine serves two purposes: it
provides a disincentive for missing class or
otherwise not participating in the game and, when
all students are playing with the same demand and
cost structures, it discourages students from letting
others search for the optimum and then stepping in
at a stage where large profits are assured.
Although the demand curve is derived from
a linear function, because only whole units can be
sold this results in a step-shaped demand relation,
with the same number of units being sold over each
incremental range of prices. For example, seven
units can be sold for any price greater than $232
and less than $268 (in whole dollars). The
advantage of this (in comparison to infinitely-
divisible production) is that it speeds up the search
for the optimal quantity. On the other hand, it
sl~ws down the search for the optimal price (once
Q is found) since it takes students several iterations
to locate the optimal whole-dollar price. Smooth
curves and divisible production would be more
suitable in the context of the mathematical
exposition of the MC=MR relation. The step
flmction is better adapted to the process of
discovery in the Principles class.
In terms of the information revealed to the
class, students are neither encouraged nor
discouraged regarding collaborative work on the
problem. Most students eventually discover that
they all face the same demand and cost conditions,
but this is not likely to become apparent until later
in the game. Students can be told that the demand
curve is stable and linear (except for the step-
function proviso). They have complete information
about their cost curves, They are advised not to be
too cautious about overproducing since the value of
information from such actions is greater than for
underproduction; overproduction brings them back
to the band defining the demand frontier, whereas
underproduction just defines a point in the interior
space below the demand function.
Record keeping
Table 1 is a sample printout of a
spreadsheet (available from the authors) used for
record keeping. Spreadsheets can be used initially
to explore alternative shapes of the demand and cost
curves, and provide relatively fast calculation of
student results to maintain every-other-day
turnaround. The first two rows contain the
parameters that describe the demand and marginal
cost curves. The rest of the spreadsheet is linked to
these parameters, so when these are changed all
related cells are simultaneously adjusted. The top
third of the table defines the variables of interest in
the experiment: P fml (the price by formula, from
the linear equation), Q, TR, TC, MC, AC, and MR.
The spreadsheet is designed to display a
graph of these relations as well, When the demand
and marginal revenue curves are derived from
equations they do not yield the integer maxima
required for the step function, but they are usually
close enough to show the effects of changes in the
parameters. Parameter changes in the spreadsheet
are also linked to the graph for immediate viewing.
The formulas used to generate the variables
shown in table 1 were constructed as follows:
P fml = 500- 35.71428571Q
TR = PQ
TC = XMC
MC = 300- 80Q + 7Q2
AC = TCIQ
MR = 500- (2)(35 .71428571)Q290 Nelson and Bei[, Jr.: Pricing Strategy Under Monopoly Conditions
Tohle 1. Sample Printout Of Spreadsheet File
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P max must be re-esrlmated If price equation (ceil> El & G 1) IS cha;gecl
P t’ml P lnJx Q otter Q able Q wI(I
hfax 500 517 0 0 0
Max 464 482 1 1 I
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Max 357 375 4
Max 321 339
Max 286 303 ;
Max 250 267 7
Max 214 ~3~ 8
Max 179 196 9
Max 143 160 10
Max 107 125 11
Max 71 89 12
Max 36 53 13
Max o 17 14
. . . .. -36 -18 15
The middle third of the table shows the
record-keeping form for ten students. Additional
students are accommodated by inserting rows into
the spreadsheet and copying down the cell formulas
from the tenth row. To use this part for record
keeping, one simply types in the student’s name, his
asking price (Price) and his quantity offered (Q
offer) for that day in the appropriate columns. The
spreadsheet then calculates the number of units he
would have been able to sell at that price (Q able),
the number of units actually sold (Q sold), and his
profit. Q sold and Profit are written on the

























































































The program works as follows:
Column label Operation
Price Type in the student’s
asking price.
Q offer Type in the student’s
quantity offered.
Q able A formula calculates
Q,m from the parameters
given in cells E1 and
G], currently: Q = (P -
500) / (-35.71428571)J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1994 291
TC
and rounds to the nearest
integer,




Q sold The program compares
Q,bi. to Q.ff,, and writes
the smaller of the two.




The program looks up
the appropriate TC for
that Qoffcr in the table
above (so as to match
the values in the
students’ instructions).




Profit If Q,O1~is positive then
the program subtracts TC
from PQ,Ol~;otherwise it
enters -TC.




The bottom third of the table shows the
maximum price (P max) that can be asked for a
given number of units, compared to the price
derived by formula (P fml). The next whole dollar
above P max forces a move to the next lower
number of whole units. The profit-maximizing
integer point for this example is $303 for 6 units,
giving a profit of $1061 (compared to $959 by
formula). Since P max must be found by trial-and-
error (due to rounding effects) this column does not
automatically adjust to changes made in the
parameters in lines 1 and 2, but must be re-done
“manually” once a new set of curves has been
defined.
Sample Results
In each period profits made by class
members (as calculated by the spreadsheet
illustrated in table 1) were saved in a separate tile.
At the end of the experiment the profits from each
of these files were combined into a single file and
summed to give the total earnings for each student.
By sorting profits in each period in
ascending order the graph in figure 1 was produced
to show how a class of 28 students approached the
single-period profit maximum of $1061 over time.
To avoid clutter only six out of 16 periods are
shown: the figure starts with the first period and
then shows every third period up to the last period
(P] 6). Some of the lines cross when the lowest
profits in a later period were less than those in an
earlier period. The graph is one way to illustrate
the overall dynamics of class performance. For
example, by period 4 three students were already
within a few dollars of the maximum (it turned out
that at least one of these was just a lucky guesser),
and by period 10 thirteen students were at or near
the maximum. The lines get shorter after period 10
because some of the students who reached the profit
maximum elected to move to another monopoly
game where a “successful advertising campaign”
had shifted demand for their product.
Table 2 shows the Price-asked, Quantity-
offered and Profit data for five selected students.
The Quantity-sold feedback from the instructor is
not shown here. Three of these students (S 1, S2,
and S3) reached the profit maximum by period 11.
The other two (S4 and S5) were still searching
when the game ended after period 16.
Figures 2a-e are graphs of the data in table
2, with lines connecting the points in the order that
the offers were submitted, Again, the horizontal
axis represents the original quantity offered, and not
the subsequent quantity sold. The difference in the
effectiveness of search strategies between the fastest
and slowest profit maximizers is conspicuous.
Figures 2a and 2C represent students using an
MC=MR strategy (they confessed to this). Figure
2b is a student who admitted to stumbling on the
optimal combination with his first few guesses.
Figure 2d is characteristic of a trial-and-error search
of the right side of the profit surface. Figure 2e
appears to be some less systematic trial-and-error
search.292 Nel,von and Beil, Jr,, Pricing S(rate~ Under Monopoly Conditions
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Figure h. Results for Student S1
.,.
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How the Experiment Illustrates the Theory
Subsequent class discussions indicated that
after playing the game students better understood
the concept that a monopolist cannot sell all the
units he wants to produce at any price he chooses,
that his profit-making possibilities are not limitless,
and that Demand is a force to be reckoned with.
Some students were tangibly impressed by the
Doctrine of Consumer Sovereignty after asking
outrageously high prices (for example, on table 2
see student S3’s profits in Period I). The lectures
on elasticity near the end of the quarter were
facilitated since students had experienced the profit
consequences of the assertion that “the demand
curve for the monopolist is not everywhere
inelastic. ” Although we ran out of time in this
class, a homework assignment could have been used
to demonstrate why the monopolist wants to operate
in a range where his consumers are sensitive to
price increases,
Students who tried mark-up pricing by
some standard percentage (like 10°/0or 15°/0 above
average cost) soon became aware that prices could
be raised much higher when demand was taken into
account. Students who mistakenly believed that the
quantity corresponding to the minimum average cost
must be the profit-maximizing quantity were soon
disabused of this notion. However, after the
experiment was over it was discovered that, by
accident of parameter choice, the quantity giving the
minimum marginal cost in this exercise also
happened to be the same as the optimal quantity.
The coincidence was pointed out in class, although
no one mentioned that this had motivated their
strategy. Future experiments can easi Iy rectify this
problem by changing the parameters in the
0.-’, . . .,’
spreadsheet price equation. For example, changing
the demand equation constant in cell E 1 from 500
to 583 will change the optimal quantity from six to
seven units, P fml to $333, P max to $350 and
maximum profit to $1610.
Except for the lucky guesser, most students
conceded that search strategies based on theory can
be more efficient than trial-and-emor, especially
after they saw how early some of their classmates
discovered the optimal price and quantity. Many of
them appeared to gain some appreciation for the use
of marginal analysis in formulating pricing
strategies. On the other hand the trial-and-error
approach may have some usefulness in real-world
situations where it is difficult or costly to
experiment with large price changes.
It is important to point out some of the
real-world conditions that were not operating in this
experiment. For example, since demand was held
constant and buyers were simulated, the information
contained in the response received from a change in
price asked or quantity offered could be interpreted
by the monopolist unambiguously. Also, although
we know from theory that a monopolist will charge
a higher price and supply a smaller quantity than
would be found under competitive equilibrium, this
can only be demonstrated empirically by
comparison with another experiment using a
competitive market institution.
Variations on a Theme
A production-to-order environment is an
obvious alternative to this advance-production game.
Here the monopolist simply posts a price and
receives feedback on how many units are ordered,J. Agr. and Applied Econ., July, 1994 295
and subsequently are to be produced and sold, at
that price. There is no concern about
overproductio~ since units are not produced until
they are ordered. Services and some industrial
goods are produced in this environment.
The advance production environment can
be easily modified to accommodate inventory
carryover. An extra column in the spreadsheet
could be set up to accumulate excess production (Q
offer - Q sold) for use in later periods. Such an
environment would eliminate the need for the line-
of-credit if inventory carrying costs are negligible.
The capacity to produce exactly to demand, or to
overproduce at no cost, both serve to speed up the
discovery of the optimum since more wide-ranging
attempts to locate the demand curve can be made
without serious effect on profits. On the other
hand, losses of the magnitudes experienced by some
students can be real “attention getters” and serve to
stimulate genuine strategy-development by
discouraging random price and quantity offers. The
simple advance-production game is generally more
challenging and encourages the student to focus on
costs as well as demand.
The indivisibility of units and the resulting
step function have been mentioned as complications.
The problem could be resolved by allowing units to
be infinitely divisible, but this would increase the
complexity of the task since equations for the cost
relation would be required in place of cost
schedules. As a compromise, schedules for
intervals of units such as 1000, 2000, 3000, etc.
could be used to provide an approximation of the
underlying equation. Students could use linear
interpolation between points as a first approximation
of the cost, then smooth out the curve. [n either
case the spreadsheet can easily be modified to
return the exact cost derived from an equation so
that record keeping of profits is based on exact
relations.
A number of issues can be demonstrated by
shifting the cost and demand curves. The
demonstration that the optimal quantity for the
monopolist need not be at the minimum of average
cost or of marginal cost was mentioned earlier. It
is also possible to demonstrate that even for the
monopolist the demand curve may be below the
average cost curve at every point, although this
would be a frustrating game for the student since all
P and Q combinations would incur losses. It might
be instructive to use a steeply ascending average
cost curve under severe diseconomies of scale or
capacity constraints. Economies of scale and
naturaI monopolies could be similarly illustrated.
Harrison, McKee, and Rutstrom tested monopoly
effectiveness under different experimental cost
conditions and found that their research subjects
achieved much higher percentages of monopoly
profit when faced with a constant or decreasing cost
tlmction than with an increasing cost iimction,
Alternative pricing strategies can be
explored. For example, students could be told that
their product is of such durability that each
consumer will only purchase one unit, and after
purchasing a unit in some period that particular
consumer would be removed from the demand
curve in fiture periods. Thus the demand curve
would be changing shape and moving letlward. A
“skimming price” policy might then be suggested
whereby the highest prices are charged early to the
consumers with the highest demand. Conversely,
students could be allowed to invest in advertising or
research and development in order to move their
demand curve rightward. As long as the instructor
controls the structure of demand several varieties of
profit-maximizing experiments with determinate
solutions are possible,
Considerable research has been focused on
laboratory monopolies, but much of it is beyond the
scope of undergraduate instruction. Plott reviewed
a number of monopoly experiments involving both
fixed and variable supply under various market
institutions such as double-oral auction, posted price
(offer or bid), sealed bid, and English and Dutch
auctions. He pointed out that the posted-offer
institution (as used in the experiment described in
this paper) gives the monopoly result predicted by
theory much more regularly than double auctions or
an institution where buyers post bids. One
explanation for this phenomenon in the double-oral
auction setting (where a single seller faces several
real buyers) is that buyers seem to withhold their
purchases and thereby force prices down by
exercising some sort of tacit countervailing power
(Plott, p. 1144).
Davis and Holt reviewed the literature on
contested market experiments. Several of these
experiments used a design where there are two296 Nekon and Beil, Jr Pricing Stralegy Under Monopoly Condilion.v
potential sellers, there may be a cost to enter the
market, and usually only one seller can earn profits
in a given period. Total surplus was as much as
40% higher in these contested markets than that
predicted under monopoly.
Several studies have examined theories of
decentralized incentive regulation of monopolies.
Using an experiment where subjects bid for a
f?anchise on a regulated monopoly, Harrison and
McKee found that performance was comparable to
contested markets. Cox and Isaac modified a
previously-used subsidy mechanism--one that
frequently led to bankruptcy of the regulated
monopolist in the laboratory--and showed that their
modification mitigated such severe penalties while
maintaining the desired convergence of prices
toward competitive levels.
Conclusions
The experiment described in this paper
allows students to explore pricing strategies
available to the monopolist. Using a trial-and-error
search of the profit surface, the strategic objective
is to make the least number of moves to find a
maximum, and then to establish that it is a global
maximum. Using marginal principles, the strategic
objective is to locate and plot the position of the
demand curve, apply the graphical MC=MR rule,
and then tine-tune the maximum price to the step
function. Although an understanding of marginal
analysis is not necessary for students to make
progressively more rewarding choices in the game,
one objective is to persuade students that this
approach is more efficient than trial-and-error.
Since demand is simulated, prices are
posted, and costs are known, the game is essentially
an investigation of individual “firm” behavior
without the complications of real-world market
idiosyncrasies. This makes it ideal for simplifying
the environment to fit monopoly theory at the
undergraduate level, while still allowing for more
elaborate extensions involving different market
institutions (auctions, posted bid, sealed bid, etc.),
the interactions of additional players (real buyers,
potential competitors, cartels, etc.), and changes in
design features (shifting demand and cost schedules,
production-to-order, inventory carryover,
advertising, R&D, etc.) suitable for more advanced
classes.
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Appendix
Instructions
This is an experiment instrategic pricing for the monopolist. Your profits from this experiment
will be converted to bonus points that you can add to your grade in the class. The conversion rate will be
one percentage point added to your final grade for every $10,000 earned in this experiment.
This experiment is designed to simulate a real-world situation in which a monopolist makes
decisions on how to price a new product that he is putting on the market. The monopolist revises his price
and quantity estimates of what the market will bear afier he receives feedback from the market. YOUwill
see that without some strategy he cannot just charge any price that he wants to and still sell all the units
that he can produce.
Each of you will be the only seller in the market. Think of yourself as having invented a unique
new product for which you have a patent. Your invention is sufficiently different from everyone else’s that
you do not need to worry about what anyone else in the class will do if you change your price. The
behavior of the buyers in your market will be simulated by an equation.




































































You start playing the game by choosing a PRICE that you are willing to sell your product for in
the first trading period, and also the QUANTITY that you will produce and offer for sale in that period.
All units that you sell in a period will be sold for the same PRICE, You can only sell whole units, e.g. not
4% units. You cannot offer more than 15 units for sale.
After you have chosen the PRICE you are asking and the QUANTITY you are offering for the
period, write it down on a piece of paper with your name on it and hand it in to me, At the next class
period I will tell you how many units you sold. When you know how many units you sold at your PRICE
for that period you can calculate your Total Revenue (gross earnings) and then subtract how much it cost
you to produce the units that you oj~ered for sale, whether they were bought or not. The difference between
your Total Revenue and your Total Cost is your net earnings or Profit, which you can convert into bonus298 Nelsonand Bell, Jr Pricing S[ra(egy Under Monopoly Conditions
points toward your course grade. Your product is perishable so you cannot carry units produced in one
period over to another period. The game will continue for several trading periods.
You do not know what the demand is for your product, so you will have to start by experimenting
with your PRICE and QUANTITY offers until you know more about how the market values your product.
In order to give you a positive incentive to play the game, a “line-of-credit” of $10,000 is being
extended to you that will function in the following way. The line-of-credit is not incorporated in your
final grade; it serves as a “safety net” for initial losses due to overproduction. You can incur $10,000 in
losses before being dropped from the game. Without such a line-of-credit some of you might feel that you
could be lowering your course grade by playing the game and that it would be safer if you did not play the
game.
To encourage you to participate, if you do not submit a price and quantity offer in a period you
will be fined $1,000 to cover “overhead”. Fines plus any other losses cannot exceed the line-of-credit, so
your grade cannot be lowered by playing the game. Note that an unexcused absence results in a $1,000
loss due to the overhead charge. We will negotiate your earnings for an excused absence.